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EARLY CONSPIRACY CASES'
Prior to the eighties there were but few reported decisions in
cases which arose in connection with labor disputes in the United
States. In consequence, all writers who discuss the beginnings
of American labor law have devoted considerable attention to the
early unreported cases in inferior courts which preceded Common-
wealth v. Hunt2 in 1842.
These early unreported cases have usually' been interpreted as
reflecting "a spirit of medievalism with its antagonism to the
working classes".4 It is commonly believed, as one writer puts
it, that "in the early part of the nineteenth century, peaceable
combinations of workingmen to better their conditions of employ-
ment were illegal both in England and the United States" ;' or,
as expressed by another, that "combinations of worlanen to raise
their wages, shorten hours and compel the employment of their
own members were held unlawful conspiracies by the courts at
common law and even under some of the statutes one hundred
years ago"., Comnon wealth kv. Hunt is usually regarded as the
case which overthrew these archaic doctrines and which marks
the beginning of the modern law of labor combinations, in which
"the legal battle ground has shifted from a fight over the right
of labor unions to exst to a contest as to what means may law-
fully be used by labor organizations in the economic struggle over
the price of labor".!-)
This interpretation of the early American labor cases will not
stand the test of an examination of the original sources. It is
supported only by a few expressions of hostility to the newly
founded labor unions by judges and prosecutors, which have been
mistaken for established legal doctrines. It was never the law
in the United States that labor unions are illegal per se, or that
1 All preserved records of these cases have been reprinted in Volumes
III and IV of the Documentary HLstory o~f Indwt riel Society, edited by
John R. Commons and E. A. Gilmore. These records include the entire
testimony and proceedings in several of these cases.
'2 (1842, Mass.) 4 Met. 111.
3 There are at least two writers who have not fallen into this error:
Stimson, Handbook of Labor Law in the United States (1890) and Drartin,
The Modern Law of Labor Uqzions.
4 Quotation from Groat, Attitude of American Courts in Labor Cacces
(1911) 49.
5 Ely, Ou0tines of Economics, 472.
6 Comment of Editor, 3 LAW AND LABoR (1921) 236.
7Francis B. Sayre in SURVEY, Jan. 7, 1922, 553.
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all strikes are unlawful. The unreported cases of the early nine-
teenth century did not turn upon the legality of the unions per
se, but on the methods which they employed to gain their ends.
Nor were the views expressed in these early cases as to the
methods which might lawfully be employed less liberal than those
now generally held by the courts.
In one respect, indeed, these early cases differed radically from
present-day legal actions in connection with labor disputes. This
was that all these early cases, with one exception, involved crimi-
nal indictments for conspiracy, not injunctions or damage suits,
as do most present-day cases. This is a difference, however, only
in the character of the actions, not in underlying legal theories.
As to these, there is little to distinguish the unreported cases of
the early nineteenth century from the law to-day.
Only one of the legal theories which played a role in the early
cases has been entirely abandoned. This was the theory that it
is illegal for working-men to combine to raise wages. This doc-
trine had the support of numerous English precedents; but in
this country it never attained the status of generally accepted
law. In about one half of the early conspiracy cases, one of the
counts in the indictment was to the effect that the defendants had
combined to raise wages. In all of these cases, however, there
were also charges of violence, picketing or closed shop rules and
practices; and it was these charges which the prosecution empha-
sized, rather than the combination to raise wages.
In the earliest case, that of the Philadelphia cordwainers in
1806, the prosecution, indeed, made the point that a combination
to raise wages is illegal at common law; but it also argued that
the defendants were not indicted "for regulating their own indi-
vidual wages, but for undertaking by a combination to regulate
the price of labor of others as well as their own".8 Recorder
Levy, however, was more positive, and squarely instructed the
jury that a combination to raise wages was illegal.2
This case was followed by eighteen other prosecutions of work-
ing-men for conspiracy in the next three decades. In only one
of them, however, did the court take the same view of the ille-
gality of combinations to raise wages as did Recorder Levy.10
This was the New York case of People v. Fisher1 in 1835, in
which Chief Justice Savage at some length developed the same
thesis, although the case involved not merely a combination to
8 3 Documentary History of American Industrial Society, 68.
9 Ibid. at 233.
10 In Commonwealth v. Carlisle (1821, Pa.) Bright. 36, which involved
the legality of a combination of masters to decrease wages, Judge Gibson
expressed the view that combinations to depress wages are criminal, if
they seek to reduce wages "below what they would be, if there was no re-
currence to artificial means by either side".
3. (1835, N. Y.) 14 Wend. 9.
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raise wages, but the threat of a strike to procure the discharge
of non-union workmen.
This decision seems to have attracted little attention until the
following year, when twenty tailors in New York City were
heavily fined by Judge Edwards upon conviction for conspiracy.
These tailors had been guilty of acts of intimidation and violence;
but a great hue and cry was raised that they had been prosecuted
because they had combined to raise their wages. An open air
mass meeting, said to have been attended by 27,000 working-men,
was held a few days after the trial, at which Chief Justice Savage
and Judge Edwards were burned in effigy and a correspondence
committee was named to communicate with other trade unions
about this case.1'. Throughout the country, the Democratic news-
papers sought to make political capital out of this case; and in
Washingtor the mechanics in the Navy Yard staged a "burial of
liberty", in which Judge Edwards figured as the executioner.13
A few months thereafter occurred the trial of the Hudson
(N. Y.) shoemakers. The real issue in this case was the legality
of the strike which the shoemakers' society had called to compel
a master to pay a heavy fine for having employed a non-union
workman. Counsel for the defense, however, found it advan-
tageous to represent this case as a prosecution of working-men
for combining to raise their wages. The outcome was "that the
court charged in favor of convicting them, but they were ac-
quitted by the jury, notwithstanding"."
After the acquital of the Hudson shoemakers, the doctrine that
a combination to raise wages is illegal was allowed to die by
common consent. No leading case was required for its over-
throw. America was poor soil for this transplanted doctrine, and
it could not withstand the hearty blasts of the Jacksonian democ-
racy. -In fact, it drooped and withered before it ever took root.
Not one of the early conspiracy cases turned exclusively, nor even
principally, upon this theory. In all of them the prosecution
centered its case upon the coercive practices of the journeymen's
societies; and Recorder Levy and Chief Justice Savage were the
only American judges who ever held that a combination to raise
wages is illegal.
The defendants in all of the cases prior to Commonweath i.
Hznt used means to effect their ends which are generally re-
garded as unlawful even now. In nearly all of these cases the
star witnesses for the prosecution were non-union worlmen who
had lost their jobs because the indicted union members refused
to work with them. Some cases involved even more doubtful
practices. In the Buffalo tailors' case in 1824 the defendants sent
-New York Journal of Commerce, June 18, 1836; New York Evening
Post, July 14, 1836.
-, Hartford Times, June 22 and 23, 1836; Washingtonian, June 23, 1836
-Hartford Times, July 13, 1836.
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a list of "black legs" to unions throughout the country to prevent
the hated non-unionists from getting work anywhere. The Balti-
more weavers' case in 1829 arose because the defendants had
taken an oath that none of them would work for a certain master
for two years; and, as has been noted, the Hudson shoemakers
in 1826 went on strike to compel a master to pay a heavy fine
for employing a non-union workman. Yet in none of these cases
nor in any other conspiracy cases prior to the Civil War was a
single workman sentenced to jail, and only in the New York
tailors' case were heavy fines imposed; while a considerable
number of these cases resulted in acquittals.
In several of these early conspiracy cases the prosecution or
the court, or both, stated that it was the methods which the de-
fendants had used which rendered their combination illegal; but
it was not until Commonwealth v. Hunt 5 that the distinction
vaguely hinted at in these early cases, between the legality of
the combination per se and the methods which it employs was
clearly expressed. This famous case, like many of the cases which
preceded it, involved a strike to procure the discharge of a non-
union workman. Today, such a strike is illegal in Massachu-
setts ;'. but in this case in 1842 the Supreme Court of that state
in a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Shaw held the
conduct of these strikers to have been entirely lawful.
This decision, however, did not, as some writers have stated,
' mark the end of the application of the conspiracy doctrine to
labor combinations. Even today this doctrine is the most im-
portant of all legal theories which figure in labor cases. Far
from repudiating this doctrine, Commonwealth v. Hunt expressed
it in the form in which it usually has been expressed since,
namely, that the legality of a combination depends upon the pur-
poses sought to be accomplished and the means used to effect
these ends.
CONSPIRACY CASES AFTER COMMONWEALTH V. HUNT' 7
Except for its influence upon the form of the statement of the
conspiracy doctrine, Commonwealth v. Hunt seems to have had
comparatively little effect upon the development of the law of
2 Supra note 2.
'0Plant v. Woods (1900) 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011; Bausch Machine
Tool Go. v. Hill (1918) 231 Mass. 30, 120 N. E. 188, and numerous other
cases.
27 The conspiracy cases later than Commonwealth v. Hunt have hereto-
fore almost entirely escaped notice. Even in the two volume Labor History
of the Unitdc States by Dr. John R. Commons and his associates, which
devotes twventy-five pages to the cases prior to 1842, only one of the later
cases is mentioned,-the Siney trial in 1875, which is noted briefly in a
foot note.
The reason why the later cases have been overlooked, is that the only
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labor combinations in this country. In the next twenty years,
indeed, only three conspiracy cases are known to have occurred
in connection with labor disputes ;18 but that there were not more
such cases is readily explained by the almost complete absence of
strikes during this period. With the general revival of trade
unionism in the closing years of the Civil War, conspiracy cases
once more became of frequent occurrence. From 1863 to 1880
there were at least seven conspiracy cases in Pennsylvania, five
in New York, three in New Jersey and one each in Connecticut,
Illinois and Missouri.5
These prosecutions led the labor organizations of this period
to demand "the repeal of the conspiracy laws",: ° by which was
meant the enactment of legislation to nullify the conspiracy doc-
information about them consists of brief accounts in the newspapers and
in the reports of labor bureaus. Some of these accounts may not be
accurate in all respects; but collectively they establish that numerous
criminal prosecutions for conspiracy occurred in connection with labor dis-
putes after Comnonwealth v. Hunt. In all probability there were many
more such cases than are noted in this article.
'
8 These cases were the Lehigh boatmen's ease in 1843 (Philadelphia
Public Ledger, Sept. 2, 1843), the Philadelphia compositors' ease in 1854
(Philadelphia North American and U. S. Gazette; Pennsylvania Bureau
of Industrial Statistics, Report, 1880-81, 276) and the Glassboro (N. J.)
glassblowers' case in 1859. (New Jersey Bureau of Labor Report, 1837,
1046).
11n addition to the cases discussed in this article the following con-
spiracy cases growing out of labor disputes occurred between 1863 and
1880: Pennsylvania-Hunters' Point Railroad ear-drivers, 1869 (American
Workman, Aug. 7, 1869); Erie printers, 1870 (Typographical Union Con-
vention Proceedings, 1870); Pittsburgh printers, 1873 (Pittsburgh Commer-
cial, Nov. 21 and 29, 1873; Pittsburgh National Labor Tribune,
March 14, 1874); New York-Keyes case, 1863 (New York Sun, April
10 and 23, 1863); New York bricklayers, 1868 (Workingmen's Advocate,
Dec. 9, 1868); Mlorrisania bricklayers and Kingston cigar makers, 1868
(National Labor Union Convention Proceedings, 1868, at 12); New York
Crispins, 1876 (New York Herald, March 10 and 30, April 1, 1876); Con-
necticut-New Haven Printers, 1871 (New Haven Journeyman Printer,
June 20, July 6 and 11, 1871); New Jersey-State v. Dozaldson (1867)
23 N. J. L. 151; Newark bricklayers, 1868; Paterson molders, 186 (Mold-
ers' Journal,'1868, at 40); Illinois-Chieago molders, 1873 (Worlingmen's
Advocate, April 5, 1873); MIissouri-Vulcan Iron Works, St. Louis, 1879
(Carpenter, July 1882).
20 The "conspiracy laws" of which labor complained were principally
prosecutions at common law or under general statutes defining conspiracy,
not statutes specifically directed against labor combinations. Exceptions
were the so-called "La Salle Black Law" enacted by the Illinois legislature
of 1863, which prohibited combining to prevent workmen from vorldng
or to interfere with the lawful use and management of property "by
threats or other means", and a similar statute enacted by Connecticut
in 1864, which was considerably toned down in 1875. Later, two
states-Connecticut in 1877 and Maine in 1880-enacted statutes penal-
izing conspiracies to interfere with the operation of railroad, gas and tele-
graph companies.
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trine of the common law. Such legislation was won in Pennsyl-
vania, New York, New Jeriey and Maryland, and in part, also
in fllinoisY' It proved a great disappointment in operation, how-
ever, actually making practically no change in the law, and fail-
ing to end prosecutions for conspiracy premised upon participa-
tion in strikes.
The fight against the "conspiracy laws" was carried on most
vigorously in Pennsylvania, because it was in that state that the
largest number and most important of the conspiracy trials oc-
curred. This state as early as 1869 passed a law declaring trade
unions to be legal if formed for "mutual aid, benefit and pro-
tection". That this law did not go far enough, however, the
unions discovered a few months after its passage, when the
members of a mine committee at Pottsville were found guilty of
conspiracy, sentenced to jail for thirty days and fined heavily in
addition because they had presented the demands of the union
to the colliery owners. Then followed renewed efforts to gain
relief through legislation, until in 1872 the labor papers again ac-
claimed the "repeal of the conspiracy laws", upon passage of a
new act which provided that working-men might singly or collec-
tively refuse to work for any employer, but also that this should
not be construed as legalizing attempts to hinder others from
working.
Under this statute arose two conspiracy trials, which in their
consequences were much more important to the labor movement
than all of the cases which preceded Commonwealth v. Hunt.3
These cases grew out of a coal miners' strike in Clearfield County
in (1875) which was conducted by the National Miners' Associa-
tion,-Ehen numerically the largest American trade union. First
fifty-six of the strikers were tried upon a charge of "conspiracy"
and thirty-six of them were convicted and sentenced to jail, al-
though they seem to have been guilty of no more serious offense
than what would now be called "peaceful picketing". Then Siney,
the president of the National Miners' Association, and Parks, one
of the organizers, were tried upon the same charge. After a
long trial, in which the union officials were defended by United
States Senator Carpenter of Wisconsin, Siney was acquitted, but
Parks was convicted. These prosecutions all but bankrupted and
21 Pennsylvania-Acts of May 8, 1869, June 14, 1872, April 20, 1876 and
June 19, 1891. New York-Laws 1870, ch. 18; Penal Code, 1881, sec, 170;
Laws,1882,.ch. 384. New Jersey-Laws 1877, at 142; New Jersey-Laws
1883, at 36. Maryland-Acts 1884, ch. 266. Illinois-Laws 1873, at 76.
2 - Commonwealth v. Curren, 3 Pitts. 143; Pennsylvania Bureau of Labor
Statistics Report, 1872-3, at 338-347.
23 The facts as to these cases here given are based upon the accounts in
Pennsylvania Bureau of Labor Statistics Report, 1880-81, 315; Working-
men's Advocate, Oct. 9, 1875; Pittsburgh National Labor Tribune, Oct. 9,
1875.
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disrupted the National Miners' Association, which never again
developed much strength.
These cases led in the next year to another liberalization of
the Pennsylvania conspiracy law, through amendment providing
that only "force, threat, or menace of harm to person or property"
should be considered illegal. Even thereafter, however, Pennsyl-
vania had numerous conspiracy cases, at least fourteen occurring
in that state during the decade of the eighties. Of these the
most important was the prosecution of D. R. Jones and Hugh
Anderson, officers of the aliners' Association, because they had
sought to organize the employes of the Waverly Coal Co. in West-
moreland County.-1 These union officials were convicted in 1881,
fined $100 each and sentenced to imprisonment for one day, and
then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the ground
that the 1876 statute had legalized their conduct. This court,
however, dismissed the appeal without delivering an opinion. In
another case in the same year a number of the members of the
Knights of Labor in Somerset County were prosecuted for con-
spiracy on the theory that mere membership in this, then secret,
society constituted a conspiracy.2- According to T. V. Powderly,
long the Grand Master of the Knights of Labor, it was this case
which led this powerful labor organization to abandon its secret
ritual. Still another important case was that of twenty miners,
members of the Knights of Labor, who in January 1887 were
sentenced to four months in jail upon conviction for conspiracy,
but pardoned by the Governor of Pennsylvania after serving half
of their sentence.'
In other states the conspiracy cases in connection with labor
disputes were less numerous and less dramatic, but by no means
infrequent or unimportant. As already noted, there were at least
eleven conspiracy cases in connection with labor disputes else-
where than in Pennsylvania in the period between 1863 and 1880.
There were still more such cases in the eighties, - pairticularly
during the years 1885 to 1887, when the general public became
greatly alarmed about the many strikes and boycotts which were
24Pennsylvania Bureau of Labor Statistics Report, 1880-31, 379-380;
Pittsburgh Dispatch, Oct. 24, 1881.
25 Powderly, Thirty Years of Labor, 2.
26 Swinton's Paper, larch 27, 1887.
27 Some of these conspiracy cases of the eighties are reported, including
Commonwealth ex rel. Vallette v. Shcriff (1881, Pa.) 15 Phil. Rep. 393;
State v. Stewart (1887) 59 Vt. 273, 9 Atl. 559; State v. Glidd (1887) 55
Conn. 47, 8 AtI. 890; Crztmp v. Commonwealth (1888) 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E.
620; Callan v. Wilson (1888) 127 U. S. 540, 8 Sup. Ct. 1301; People co
rel. Gill v. Walsh (1888) 110 N. Y. 633, 17 N. E. 871. The great majority
of the conspiracy cases of the eighties, as earlier, however, are unreported
and can be traced only through the newspapers and through the report- of
state labor departments.
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then occurring and the violence which characterized some of these
disputes.
Since then comparatively few criminal prosecutions for con-
spiracy have grown out of labor disputes, except under statutes
prohibiting combinations to commit specific offenses such as in-
terference with the mails or with interstate commerce.28 This
development, however, was due neither to court decisions over-
throwing old doctrines nor to legislation repealing the "conspiracy
laws". If anything, court decisions of the later eighties and early
nineties were less favorable to labor than the decisions of an
earlier date; certainly, none of them were as favorable as Com-
monwealth v. Hunt. -As for legislation, instead of laws to afford
labor relief from the conspiracy doctrine, several states during
this period enacted statutes specifically directed against labor
combinations. 20
EARLY INJUNCTIONS
Criminal prosecutions for conspiracy became infrequent after
the "eighties" not because of any changes in the substantive law,
but solely because injunctions became the usual form of action
in legal controversies growing out of labor disputes.
Precisely when the first injunction was issued in the United
States is not known, but it was several years before Sherry v.
Perkins"° and United States v. Debs3- which are usually cited as
the first labor injunctions. The earliest case in which an injunc-
tion was sought but not granted, was Johnson Harvester Co. v.
Meinhardt 2 which arose" at Brocksport, near Rochester, New
York, in 1880. In his Thirty Years of Labor,3 T. V. Powderly
states that injunctions were actually issued in 1883 at Baltimore,
Md. and at Kent, Ohio, against glass workers belonging to the
Knights of Labor Assembly No. 300, to prevent their efforts to
induce contract laborers from Europe to leave the manufacturers
who had imported them. Certain it is that an injunction was
issued during a coal miners' strike on Dec. 8, i884 by Circuit
Judge D. D. Miracle of Boone County, Iowa, in the case of Key-
28 A few cases, however, have occurred since 1890 which are in all re-
spects similar to the earlier conspiracy cases. Most of these cases are
unreported, but at least two of them are reported: State v. Dyer (1895) 67
Vt. 690, 32 Atl. 814 and State v. Stoecford (1904) 77 Conn. 227, 58 AtI. 769.
2 Illinois, Laws 1887, 168 (repealed, Laws 1891, 100) and Laws 1887,
167; Wisconsin, Laws 1887, ch. 287; Minnesota, Laws 1886, ch. 139.
30 (1888) 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307.
31 (1894, C. C. N. D. Ill.) 64 Fed. 724.
- (1880, N. Y.) 60 How. Pr. 168. In the Iron Molder's Journal, May 10,
1881, it is stated that a temporary injunction was allowed against the
strikers, which the court refused to make permanent after a hearing.
From the reported case, however, it would seem that no injunction was
ever issued.
33 At 442-443.
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stone Coal Co. v. Davis."-- A year later S. A. Brewster, publisher
of the Advertiser.at Creston, Iowa, secured an injunction against
the circulation of a sheet giving the names of advertisers in his
columns and urging that they be boycotted by friends of labor.23
It was not until 1836, however, that there were any large
number of labor injunctions. In that year at least five injunc-
tions were issued in connection with labor disputes in Chicago,
one of them a federal injunction allowed to the Lake Shore Rail-
road by Judge Gresham26 A yet larger number of injunctions
were secured by the Missouri Pacific in the Southwest strike of
this year. In M Iissouri alone there appear to have been eight
distinct injunctions, and others were taken out in Arkansas,
Kansas and Texas, including two federal injunctions in Kansas.::
In the same strike another federal injunction was issued to the
International & Great Northern R. R. Co. in Texas. :  During
this year, also, an injunction was issued against a boycott at
Richmond, Va., and another injunction in New York City against
the enforcement of a rule of the musicians' union which pro-
hibited members from playing with non-members29 In this year,
also, the first notice was taken of labor injunctions in the legal
periodicals.
It was not until some years later, however, that the modern
well-rounded theory in justification of the issuance of injunctions
in labor disputes was developed. This theory links injunctions in
labor disputes with the protection of property from irreparable
injury. This-has always been the principal reason for the inter-
vention of equity; but it was invoked as a justification for the
issuance of injunctions in labor disputes in but few cases prior
to 1895.40, The explanation of this fact is that the property which
is protected by injunctions is not merely the physical property of
z The complete text of this injunction is given in the Report of the
Iowa Bureau of Labor Statistics for 1885, at 155.
3 Bradstreets, Dec. 19, 1885, at 396.
Z These injunctions were: Lake Shore & Michigan So. R. R. v. Switch-
mnen, Judge Gresham (text in Indianapolis Journal, June 29, 1886);
Brv-3chke v. Fzurniture Workers' Union No. 1, 1 Cmr. L. N mvs, 300; Lake
Shore & Michigan So. R. R. v. O'Kcefe, Judge Garnett (Chicao Times,
April 23, 1886); an injunction secured by the Calumet Iron & Steel Co.
(Chicago Times, May 8, 1886) ; and an injunction secured by the Northwest-
ern Fertilizer Co. (Chicago Times, May 30, 1886).
r "Official History of the Great Strike of 1886" in the Missouri Bureau
of Labor Report for 1887, 28-35; Chicago Times, March 21, 1886.
", Chicago Times, March 17, 1886.
39 New York Bureau of Labor Report, 1886, at 806; 21 Azi L. Ruv. 530.
40 There is a suggestion of the modern theory in Johnson Harcctcr Co.
v. Meinhardt, suprao note 32, at 171, in which it was rejected, and there are
fairly clear statements of this theory in Brzschko -v. Futriture MAahcra'
Union, supra note 36; Brace v. Evans (1888) 3 Ry. & Corp. Law Journal,
560 and, above all, in Barr v. Essex Trades Council (1894) 53 N. J. Eq.
101, 30 Atl. 885.
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the complainants, 41 but also their right of free access to the labor
and commodity markets and their established relations with cus-
tomers and employes, which in the "eighties" were not yet gen-
erally thought of as property rights.
Two theories, which now are but seldom invoked in labor cases,
were employed at this time to justify the issuance of injunctions
in labor disputes. One of these was the ancient doctrine that
equity will intervene to protect the public from nuisances.4 2  The
other, and much more important in this connection, was the theory
that the courts must protect public carriers in the discharge of
their duty to render service to the public at all times.
As early as the great railroad strike of 1877 the courts ex-
tended their protection over the large part of the railroad mileage
of the country which was then in the hands of receivers. This
was done through orders directing the marshals to advise the
strikers and the public generally that interference with the opera-
tion of these railroads would be punished as contempt of court.4
These orders were much like present-day injunctions, except that
they were not directed against named individuals and that they
included an instruction to the marshals to employ enough special
deputies, at the receivers' expense, adequately to protect the
property.
Similar orders in receivership cases were issued in the Wabash
strikes of 1885 and in the Southwest strike of 1886. In this last
strike, as has been noted, the courts also issued a considerable
number of injunctions to the Missouri Pacific, a railroad not in
the hands of receivers; and a few weeks later Judge Gresham
issued his injunction for the protection of the solvent Lake Shore
line. These injunctions were premised upon the theory that
since public carriers are in duty bound to serve the public at
all times, it is the function of the courts to protect them against
all interference which would prevent them from fulfilling this
obligation. Four years earlier, during the freight handlers'
41 In a few of the early injunction cases the courts apparently sought
only to protect the physical property of the complainants. See Keystone
Coal Co. v. Davis, Boone County, Iowa, Dec. 8, 1884 (Report of the Iowa
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1885, at 155), and New York, L. E. & W. R. R.
v. Wenger (1886, Ohio) 17 Wx. L. BuLu. 306.
4 This theory was invoked in Murdock v. Walker (1893) 152 Pa. 595,
25 Atl. 492; Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. Miners' Union (1892, C. C. D. Id-
aho) 51 Fed. 260; and Elder v. Whitesides (1895, C. C. E. . La.) '72 Fed,
724.
43 Out of these orders to marshals to protect the property of railroads
in the hands of receivers and to warn strikers against interference issued
during the great strike of 1877 arose the reported cases Seeor v. Toledo,
Peoria & Warsaw R. R. (1877, C. C. N. D. Ill.) 7 Biss. 513 and King v. Ohio
& Mississippi R. R. (1877, C. C. E. D. Ind.) Fed. Cas. No. 7800. In addi-
tion there were in other districts, as disclosed by contemporary newspaper
accounts, about a half dozen similar orders which did not figure in any
reported cases.
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strike of 1882, the attorney general of New York had sought a
writ of mandamus to compel the railroads involved promptly to
handle all freight offered to them by shippers." At that time
a New York Supreme Court justice held that equity will not
intervene to compel public carriers to fulfill their duty to serve
the public. In these 1886 cases, however, this obligation was
made the basis for injunctions to protect the railroads from in-
terference by strikers. In the next year was passed the Inter-
state Commerce Act, and in 1890 the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
These acts were interpreted in numerous cases in inferior federal
courts as expressing in statutory form the right of equity courts
to intervene in the interests of the general public to protect pub-
lic carriers in the operation of their properties, and furnished the
justification for a majority of all injunctions issued in labor cases
in the later eighties and early nineties.
During this period many orders in receivership cases like these
first used in the railroad strike of 1877 were issued, in addition
to the numerous injunctions. In fact, these orders in receiver-
ship cases were popularly called injunctions," although usually
directed to the marshals and mentioning none of the strikers by
name. Except for this difference in form, however, there was
little to distinguish the early injunctions from the directions to
marshals in receivership cases. In many, if not nearly all early
injunction cases the marshals employed, often under the specific
direction of the courts, special deputies at the complainant's
expense to protect their property. As this practice clearly indi-
cates, injunctions were generally thought of at this time as having
the same purpose as receivership orders, namely, to place the
property of public carriers under the protection of the equity
courts.
With such a theory of injunctions, it is not surprising that
their use in labor disputes provoked a great deal of protest on
the ground that equity was being employed to enforce the crim-
inal law and, thus operated, to deny persons accused of crimes
the right of trial by jury. This was the first line of attack upon
injunctions in labor cases and had the support of many eminent
critics. 6
4A full account of the proceedings in this case and of the decision of
the court is given in the New York Daily Tribune, July 18, 19, 20 and 29,
1882.
4r An illustration of this confusion is afforded by the vell-lmowm "in-
junction" of Judge Jenkins in the ease of Farmers Loan & Trnst Co. -e.
Northern Pacific R. R., which was modified by the Circuit Court of Appeals
in Arthur v. Oakes (1894, C. C. A. 7th) 63 Fed. 310. This was in fact
a receivership order, not an injunction of the modern kind.
4c6 Among the persons who during the "nineties" criticized the uwe made
of injunctions on this score were Dean William Draper Lewis, S. S. Greg-
ory, later president of the American Bar Association, Charles C. Allen,
F. J. Stimson, Chief Justice McCabe of the Supreme Court of Indiana,
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But even before these critics became vocal, the courts were
gradually developing the present-day theory, which makes the
object sought by injunctions not the enforcement of the criminal
law but the protection of property from irreparable injury. This
shift occurred through the recognition of the right of free access
to the labor and commodity markets, often called "the right to
do business", as property, just as deserving of the protection of
the courts as "tangible" property. Isolated cases holding such
a definition of property are very old; but it was not until about
the time when injunctions were first used in labor disputes that
this conception became general. Such extension of the concept
of property occurred independently of the use of injunctions in
labor disputes, and merely reflected the economic fact that the
right to do business and established relationships had become in
this industrial age the most valuable of all business assets. In
fact, this modern definition of what constitutes property was not
generally adopted in labor injunction cases until more than ten
years after the first labor injunction was issued.
The present-day justification of the use of injunctions in labor
disputes came into general acceptance after the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the Debs case in 1895.41 In this
famous case the lower court premised the injunction which it
allowed to the Attorney General of the United States upon the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Supreme Court, however, refused
to pass upon the question whether injunctions can be used to
enforce this penal statute, and found the justification for the is-
suance of the injunction in the ancient doctrine that equity will
protect property from irreparable injury.
CONCLUSION
The development of the law of labor combinations in the United
States has been very different from that of England. In Eng-
land labor unions were in the early nineteenth century deemed
to be illegal, even criminal combinations; and every act in further-
ance of their objects was an indictable offense. By statutory
enactments, culminating in the Trade Union Act of 1871, the
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875 and the
Trades Disputes Act of 1906, however, labor unions have now not
only been legalized, but their acts have been exempted entirely
from the law of conspiracy; and they have even been exempted
from all liability for tortious acts committed in their behalf.
In the United States, it was never generally accepted as law
that labor unions are unlawful, although a few attempts were
made to apply what was called the "common law" rule of the
U. S. Circuit Judge Caldwell, and Chief Justice Tuley of the Illinois Ap.
pellate Court.
4 Debs v. United States (1895) 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900,
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illegality of all combinations to raise wages. From the outset,
the courts of this country generally accorded working-men the
right to organize for their mutual economic betterment, and
scrutinized only the measures they adopted to gain their ends.
But while labor unions never were unlawful in this country, as
they were at one time in England, they, also, have never gained
the same freedom of action which has now been accorded to labor
by acts of Parliament. The decisions of the courts today upon
what conduct in the furtherance of the objects of labor unions
is lawful, are not one whit more liberal than the doctrines an-
nounced in the earliest cases; and the statutes enacted have been
practically without effect. As regards substantive rights, the
law of labor combinations in the United States has remained
unchanged, except as to details, throughout its entire history.
The fundamentally important changes which have occurred,
relate to remedies, not to substantive rights. For more than
three quarters of a century after the first American labor case,
practically the only remedy was a criminal prosecution for con-
spiracy. Then in the "eighties" was developed the injunction,
and within the last fifteen years the damage suit. From a prac-
tical point of view it is the stages in the development of these
remedies which constitute the most important chapters in the
history of the American law of labor combinations.
